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IN HERODOTUS’ HISTORIES 3.38.1 
SOME REMARKS ON THE CONCEPT OF ΝΟΜΟΣ* 
ABSTRACT: The concepts of νόμος and φύσις were key to sophistical thinking. The 
sophistical opposition between the two concepts exerted a great influence in the fifth 
century BC. The objective of this contribution is to identify the presence of sophistical 
elements in Herodotus’ Histories, taking a historical perspective. The approach will 
include an analysis of the notion of νόμος (‘custom’). This examination is intended to 
demonstrate the thesis that Herodotus uses intellectual discussions from the fifth century 
BC but also transposes the concept of sophistry in order to restore an archaic conception 
of νόμος. 
SOMMARIO: Le nozioni di νόμος e φύσις sono concetti-chiave nel pensiero sofistico. 
L’opposizione sofistica tra queste due nozioni esercitò una notevole influenza nel V secolo 
a.C. Lo scopo di questo contributo è identificare la presenza di elementi sofistici nelle 
Storie di Erodoto, assumendo una prospettiva storica. Lo studio conterrà un esame della 
nozione di νόμος (‘costume’). La presente analisi intende dimostrare la tesi per cui Erodoto 
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usufruì effettivamente delle discussioni intellettuali di V sec. a.C. e traspose il concetto di 
sofisma per ripristinare una concezione arcaica di νόμος.  
KEYWORDS: Herodotus; Protagoras; Heraclitus; Sophistry; νόμος 
1. Introduction 
The emergence of sophistry as an intellectual movement in Athens in 
around the fifth century1 has been one of the most-questioned 
developments in the field of philosophy. The negative images of the 
Sophists provided mainly by Plato and Xenophon, as well as by Aristotle in 
the fourth century, demonstrate the intellectual tensions inherent in the 
formation of concepts at this time. These images can be considered the 
result of a range of prejudices that existed, from which the ideas 
promulgated by the sophist movement were produced and then invested 
with new meanings by later authors (primarily Greco-Roman, Alexandrian 
and Christian scholars in diverse intellectual contexts). Notably, the 
fragments of sophistical thought that have been preserved and the 
testimonies contemporaneous with the sophist movement do not offer a 
homogeneous, uniform image. Indeed, texts from the fifth century lack 
criteria for the definition of the movement, despite indicating the influence 
that the sophists had upon intellectual development in the classical period. 
The concepts produced by this movement, as well as the logics enabling the 
articulation of such discourses, play key roles in various fifth-century 
discursive records from fields including dramatic art (tragedy and comedy), 
medicine, philosophy and historiography. For this reason, recovering the 
sophistical traces present in the thought of the fifth century is of vital 
importance in understanding the political logics that operated in this 
intellectual context. 
The aim of this paper, therefore, is to analyse the acceptance of the 
sophistical concept of νόμος in Herodotus’ Histories. In conceptual terms, 
this acceptance represents a novel stance and a rupture with previous 
thought, in which meaning developed from the emergence of a new 
articulatory logic typical of the context of Athenian democracy. Thus, 
analysing this concept also entails studying the logic that allowed it to be 
articulated. As the relationship between the concept and the articulatory 
                                                            
1 All the dates given in the paper refer to the era before Christ. All further references 
to dates should be understood as pertaining to the BC period, although the abbreviation 
‘BC’ has been omitted for the sake of brevity. 
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logic can be considered a historical development, the use of a method that 
takes the historical dimension into account is proposed here. 
Traditionally, the study of the concepts of νόμος and φύσις has been 
approached from a philological or a philosophical perspective due to, 
firstly, the importance that these ideas acquired within tragic and 
philosophical discourses2 and, secondly, the legal dimension of the concept 
of νόμος.3 Since the linguistic turn in the mid-twentieth century, the need to 
examine concepts from a historical perspective has become a central aspect 
of theoretical-historiographic research.4 Indeed, this approach has acquired 
                                                            
2 Cf. J. W. Beardslee, The Use of φύσις in Fifth-Century Greek Literature, Chicago, 
The University of Chicago Press, 1918; F. Heinimann, Nomos und Physis: Herkunft und 
Bedeutung einer Antithese im Griechischen Denken des 5. Jahrhunderts [1945], Darmstadt, 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgessellschaft, 1980; M. Pohlenz, “Nomos und Physis”, Hermes, 81 
(4), 1953, p. 418-38; M. Gigante, Nomos basileus, Napoli, Bibliopolis, 1993; W. K. C. 
Guthrie, The Sophists, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977; F. Reimer, 
“Natürliche Gleichheit und gesetzliche Unterscheidung - Zur Nomos-Physis-Antithese bei 
Hippias von Elis”, in S. Kirste, K. Waechter, M. Walther (Hrsg.), Sophistik. Entstehung, 
Gestalt und Folgeprobleme des Gegensatzes von Naturrecht und positivem Recht, Stuttgart, 
Franz Steiner Verlag, 2002, p. 83-103; in addition to the papers presented at the Patras’ 
congress, edited by A. L. Pierris (ed.), Phúsis and Nómos. Power, Justice and the Agonistical 
ideal of Life in High Classicism, Patras, Institute for Philosophical Research, 2007. 
3 Cf. M. Ostwald, Nomos and the Beginnings in the Athenian Democracy, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1969; M. Gagarin, Antiphon the Athenian, Austin, University of Texas 
Press, 2002. 
4 See in Germany, on one hand, the development of hermeneutics (H.-G. Gadamer, 
Wahrheit und Methode II: Ergänzungen Register, in Gesammelte Werke, Band 2, 
Tübingen, Mohr, 1993, p. 77-91), and, on the other hand, the Begriffsgeschichte (R. 
Koselleck, Vergangene Zukunft, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1995; Id., Kritik und 
Krise. Eine Studie zur Pathogenese der bürgerlichen Welt, 1959, trans. K. Tribe, Critique 
and Crisis. Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society, Cambridge, The MIT 
Press, 1988), as well as in England the theoretical contributions of the ‘Cambridge School’ 
(Q. Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas”, H&T, 8.1, 1969, p. 3-
53 and J. Pocock, “The History of Political Thought a Methodological Inquiry”, in P. 
Laslett and W. G. Runciman (eds.), Philosophy, Politics and Society, New York, Barnes and 
Noble, 1962, p. 183-202; reprinted in Political Thought and History, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 3-19) and the ‘Post-Marxist School’ (E. Laclau & 
Ch. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, 
Second Edition, London and New York, Verso, 2001); in France the development of 
‘archeology’ (M. Foucault, Les mots et les choses, Paris, Gallimard, 1966; Id., L’archéologie 
du savoir, Paris, Gallimard, 1969), the analysis of discourse (R. Robin, Histoire et 
Linguistique, Paris, Armand Colin, 1973) and recently the histoire conceptuelle du politique 
(P. Rosanvallon, “Pour une histoire conceptuelle du politique (note de travail)”, RS, 4 (1-
2), 1986, p. 93-105; Id., La dèmocratie inachevée, Paris, Seuil, 2000; Id., Pour une histoire 
conceptuelle du politique, Paris, Seuil, 2003). 
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even greater relevance in recent decades.5 The area of study has been under-
examined, however, in relation to classical studies.6 The current study can 
be considered part of the historical approach to the research of concepts, 
although the existence of multiple historiographical traditions is 
presupposed here.7 It is also assumed that political concepts can be thought 
of as expressions of the social struggle for meaning.8 In this context, texts 
are defined as ‘speech-acts’,9 within which the contradictions and 
ambiguities that underlie the definition of concepts are inscribed by 
historical actors. As such, the study is framed in the ‘history of the 
political’,10 offering an analysis in which the text is considered a method of 
political intervention11 in the hegemonic struggle.12 
In this paper, I will analyse the characterisation of the concept of νόμος 
in Herodotus’ Histories, 3.38.1. The hypothesis utilised here is that the 
transposition of sophistical concepts enables Herodotus to reveal the 
controversial tensions inherent in the articulation of such concepts. 
                                                            
5 In addition to the growing literature on particular concepts, there are journals 
dedicated specifically to this field of studies that have been developed, such as 
Contributions to the History of Concepts (Helsinki University) or in Spanish Conceptos 
históricos (National University of San Martín), as well as the Ibero-American Conceptual 
History Project: Iberconceptos (University of the Basque Country). 
6 Pioneer in this field: Ch. Meier, Die Entstehung des Politischen bei den Griechen, 
1983, trans. D. McLintock, The Greek Discovery of Politics, Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 1990; Id., Introduction à l’anthropologie politique de l’Antiquité classique, 
Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1984. 
7 For reasons of space, theoretical-historiographical considerations regarding the 
articulation of these traditions have not been examined further here (see supra, note 4). 
For an elaboration of the relevant points, please refer to J. E. Palti, “The ‘Theoretical 
Revolution’ in Intellectual History: From the History of Political Ideas to the History of 
Political Languages”, H&T, 53, 2014, p. 387-405. 
8 Cf. Rosanvallon, “Pour une histoire conceptuelle”, p. 17-31; Koselleck, Vergangene 
Zukunft, p. 114; Q. Skinner, “‘Social Meaning’ and the Explanation of Social Action”, in J. 
Tully (ed.), Meaning and Context, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1988, p. 79-96, especially 90-
96; see the application of this perspective in: S. Barrionuevo, “La praxis filosófica como 
praxis política. Una lectura de ‘lo político’ en el Fedro de Platón”, Praxis Filosófica, 41, 
2016, p. 59-82. 
9 Cf. J. Austin, How to do Things with Words, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1962, p. 94-
131. For its application to the field of historical study: Skinner, “Meaning and 
Understanding”; Pocock, “The History of Political Thought”. 
10 Cf. Rosanvallon, “Pour une histoire conceptuelle”.  
11 Cf. Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding”; Id., “Conventions and the 
Understanding of Speech Acts”, PhQ, 20.79, 1970, p. 118-138. 
12 Cf. Laclau & Mouffe, Hegemony, p. 111-115, 134-145; E. Laclau, On Populist 
Reason, London and New York, Verso, 2005, p. 83-93; Id., Emancipation(s), London and 
New York, Verso, 1996, p. 36-46; Id., Los fundamentos retóricos de la sociedad, Buenos 
Aires, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2014, p. 99-125. 
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2. The concept of νόμος in Herodotus 
The formulation of the νόμος-φύσις opposition is attributed to sophistry by 
the doxographical tradition.13 In Plato’s dialogue Protagoras (337c-e), this 
opposition is placed in Hippias’ thoughts, being described as the axis from 
which ‘shame’ is formed (ἡμᾶς οὖν αἰσχρὸν τὴν μὲν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων 
εἰδέναι). Dümmler14 assumes not only that this is an authentic fragment 
from Hippias, but also that lines 337c7-e2 can be considered the first 
application of the opposition νόμος-φύσις to the legal and moral arenas.15 
While ‘sophists’ are absent as such in the Histories,16 they are present in a 
comparison made by Herodotus, in which discourses are introduced in a 
way that creates a transposition within the subject of enunciation. Thus, 
sophistical logic appears in the operative eristic form,17 as well as in the 
constitutive opposition of thought (νόμος-φύσις also appears in Herodotus, 
7.102-104).18 Here, the Sophists are presented not as an enunciation agent, 
but as a discursive operation – the text is inscribed as a ‘speech-act’, in as 
much as it seeks to produce a discussion around this conceptual dispute.19 
                                                            
13 Cf. S. Barrionuevo, “Nota sobre una atribución de la oposición nómos-phúsis a la 
sofística (Platón, Protágoras 337d1-3)”, Mutatis Mutandis, 6, 2016, p. 119-122. 
14 Cf. F. Dümmler, Akademika: Beiträge zur Literaturgeschichte der sokratischen 
Schulen, Gießen, Ricker, 1889, p. 252. 
15 This statement is shared, among others, by E. Dupréel, Les sophistes: Protagoras, 
Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias, Neuchatel, Éditions du Griffon, 1948, p. 213, and H.-T. 
Johann, “Hippias von Elis und der Physis-Nomos-Gedanke”, Phronesis, 18, 1973, p. 15-
25, especially p. 16, for whom, despite Gomperz’s objections, this evaluation acquires great 
acceptance. 
16 The term occurs three times only throughout the work – twice in the plural 
nominative (σοφισταί, Hdt. 1. 29.3 and 2. 49.6) and once in the singular dative (σοφιστῇ, 
4.95.2). The use of the singular dative refers to Pythagoras as a ‘member of the seven sages’, 
while the plural nominative form constitutes a reference to ‘the wise’ in a general sense. 
Herodotus never uses the term to refer to a clearly defined social group. 
17 It is not just the term ‘eristic’ (Hdt. 7.50.2) that appears as a type of logical 
sophistry in the Histories; the concept of ‘antilogy’ (1.1-5, 126-127, 1.80-82, 9.41.2, 7.10a) 
is also mentioned. 
18 Cf. R. Thomas, Herodotus in Context: Ethnography, Science and the Art of 
Persuasion, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 109-112, 123-125. For a 
analysis of Xerxes and Damaratus dialogue, see A. Dihle, “Herodot und die Sophistik”, 
Philologus, 106, 1962, p. 207-220; S. Forsdyke, “Athenian Democratic Ideology and 
Herodotus’ Histories”, AJPh, 122 (3), 2001, p. 329-358, especially 341-354; G. J. Basile, 
“Jerjes y Demarato en las Historias de Heródoto: identidades cruzadas entre lo griego y lo 
bárbaro”, Circe clás. mod., 18(1), 2014, p. 81-99. 
19 Cf. Austin, How to do Things with Words, p. 94-131. This characteristic allows us 
to consider them as ‘intellectuals’, see S. Barrionuevo, “‘Intelectuales’ en el mundo antiguo. 
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Given the limits established by my own objective in this paper, however, I 
will dwell on the transposition made by Herodotus in relation to the 
concept of νόμος only. 
Herodotus dedicates an excursus to the νόμος concept in 3.38.1. In the 
passage, he tries to explain the cause behind the follies (ἐκμαίνω) of 
Cambises (Hdt. 3.27-37), citing the mocking (καταγελᾶν) of sacred things 
(ἱροῖσι) and of those sanctioned by custom (νομαίοισι) as the key issues. The 
argument is based on Herodotus’ conception of νόμος, which can be seen in 
the following text: 
εἰ γάρ τις προθείη πᾶσι ἀνθρώποισι ἐκλέξασθαι κελεύων νόμους τοὺς καλλίστους ἐκ τῶν 
πάντων νόμων, διασκεψάμενοι ἂν ἑλοίατο ἕκαστοι τοὺς ἑωυτῶν· οὕτω νομίζουσι πολλύ τι 
καλλίστους τοὺς ἑωυτῶν νόμους ἕκαστοι εἶναι.  
For it were proposed to all nations to choose which seemed best of all customs, each, 
after examination made, would place its own first; so well is each persuaded that its 
own are by far the best (Hdt. 3.38.1).20 
The assumption made in the extract is based on a ‘cultural experiment’ 
carried out by Darius (3.38.3-4), who asks the Greeks whether they would 
be able to eat each other’s corpses, as well as asking the Indians whether 
they would choose to incinerate corpses. Both sets of people respond 
indignantly that such actions would constitute blasphemy. In an 
examination of this passage, Thomas21 argues that the ethnographic work 
of Herodotus would have been influenced by new ideas arising in around 
the fifth century. She attributes the conceptualization of νόμος to the 
framework established by the antithesis νόμος-φύσις. Thomas concludes 
that “the Darius experiment […] forms one of the best concrete 
illustrations of ‘sophistic relativism’ that we have”, adding that “Herodotus 
was a sophist too”.22 In support of her claim, Thomas appeals to the 
sophistic ‘cultural relativism’23 seen within the Protagorean influence, as 
                                                                                                                                           
Notas sobre un concepto histórico”, Anuario de la Escuela de Historia – Virtual, 9, 2016, 
p. 1-16. 
20 For the Greek text I follow: H. B. Rosén, Herodoti Historiae, 2 vols. (Bibliotheca 
Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana), Leipzig, Teubner 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987; and quote the English translation of A. D. Godley, Herodotus. 
Histories, 4 vols. (Loeb Classical Library), Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1961-6. 
21 Thomas, Herodotus, p. 122-34. 
22 Ibid. 126. 
23 Cf. Protágoras: Pl., Tht. 167c4-5; 171-2 [= EGPh 31 R9b (Laks & Most)]; Prt. 
327, 334 y Tht. 151e-152a [= DK 80B1 = EGPh 31 R4 (Laks & Most)]; Anonymus 
Iamblichi Iambl., Protr. 95.13-104 [= DK 89A1 = EGPh 40 (Laks & Most)] y Ps.-Tuc. 
3.84.1 [= DK 89A2* (adición: ed. Untersteiner 2009 = ed. De Romilly 1969)]; Hippias: 
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affirmed by a passage from Plato’s Theaetetus (but attributed to 
Protagoras): 
ἐπεὶ οἷά γ’ ἂν ἑκάστῃ πόλει δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι αὐτῇ, ἕως ἂν αὐτὰ 
νομίζῃ. 
I claim that whatever seems right and honourable to a state is really right and 
honourable to it, so long as it believes it to be so (Pl., Tht. 167c4-5).24 
Cartledge25 and Romm26 also note the parallel between Darius’ cultural 
experiment and Protagorean thought revealed by these two passages. On 
this point, Humphreys27 states that, “if the passage is taken in isolation, out 
of context, Herodotus appears as a cultural relativist”. She adds that the 
reference to Pindar’s poem in Herodotus 3.38.4 should also be taken into 
account here: ὀρθῶς μοι δοκέει Πίνδαρος ποιῆσαι νόμον πάντων βασιλέα φήσας 
εἶναι (“it is, I think, rightly said in Pindar’s poem that use and wont is lord 
of all”). With this in mind, Humphreys28 asserts that the Herodotean 
conception of νόμος oscillates between two extremes: on one hand, it allows 
human behaviour to be explained in terms of the predictability of a social 
group (which is from whence the ‘madness’ of Cambises is derived), while, 
on the other hand, a general principle cannot be established (as evident in 
the ‘aberration’ generated between the Greeks and the Indians). While the 
content of the ‘empirical νόμος’ cannot be deduced via a universal principle, 
a defence of ‘cultural relativism’ is not necessarily implied here. This can be 
seen in Herodotus’ explanation of ‘madness’ as ‘being outside of itself’ 
(ἐκμαίνω), in which a transcendental rule is established, the operation of which 
is independent of the culture in which the rule is developed. In this case, the 
transcendental rule can be understood as a process that eliminates excess.29 
                                                                                                                                           
Pl., Prt. 337d [= DK 86C1 = EGPh 36 D17 (Laks & Most)]; Antiphon: POxy XI n. 1364 
(ed. Hunt [= DK 87B44 = EGPh 37 D38, R7 (Laks & Most)]) y CPF 17 F1-2 (ed. F. D. 
Decleva Caizzi & G. Bastianini, Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini, I.1*, Firenze, 
Olschki, 1989 [= EGPh 37 D38a-c (Laks & Most)]). 
24 Greek Text and Translation: H. N. Fowler, Plato’s Theaetetus (Loeb Classical 
Library), Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1967. 
25 P. Cartledge, The Greeks: A Portrait of Self and Others, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2002, p. 74-75. 
26 J. Romm, Herodotus, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998, p. 98, 178. 
27 S. Humphreys, “Law, Custom and Culture in Herodotus”, Arethusa, 20, 1987, p. 
211-220, especially p. 212. 
28 Ibid., p. 219. 
29 Cf. J. A. S. Evans, “Despotes nomos”, Athenaeum, 43, 1965, p. 142-153, especially 
p. 147; H. R. Immerwahr, Form and Thought in Herodotus, Cleveland, Press of Western 
Reserve University, 1980, p. 320; V. Ehrenberg, Die Rechtsidee im frühen Griechentum, 
Leipzig, Hirzel, 1921, p. 119; T. Harrison, Divinity and History: The Religion of 
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For Humphreys,30 this position places Herodotean thought closer to 
the pre-Socratic conception of νόμος than to the sophistical one. She 
demonstrates this by referring to Heraclitus, fr. 53 DK:31 
πόλεμος | πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἐστι, πάντων δὲ βασιλεύς, | καὶ τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς ἔδειξε τοὺς δὲ 
ἀνθρώπους, | τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐποίησε τοὺς δὲ ἐλευθέρους. 
War | is father of all (beings) and kind of all, | and so he renders some gods, others 
men, | he makes some slaves, others free (Hippol. IX 9.4).32 
The distinction between gods and men in this passage is interpreted in the 
light of fr. 62 DK33 by Gomperz.34 Kirk35 also accepts the connection 
between the two fragments but considers that it should not try to explain it 
from this connection. If we analyse πατήρ and πάντων δὲ βασιλεύς (i.e. the 
attributes36 of πόλεμος) in relation to the excerpt above, similarities with 
                                                                                                                                           
Herodotus, Oxford and New York, Clarendon Press, 2000; J. Mikalson, “Religion in 
Herodotus”, in E. Bakker, I. de Jong and H. van Wees (eds.), Brill’s Companion to 
Herodotus, Leiden, Brill, 2002, p. 187-198; Id., Herodotus and Religion in the Persian 
Wars, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2003. 
30 Humphreys, “Law”, p. 214. 
31 Here, I refer to the DK edition used most widely in the twentieth century. For 
both the Greek text and the English translation, I follow M. Marcovich’s critical edition, 
Heraclitus: Greek Text with a Short Commentary, editio maior, Mérida, The Los Andes 
University Press, 1967. I have included the numbering for this edition in brackets, as well 
as to the relevant modern editions in each case (see in particular the recent edition by A. 
Laks & G. W. Most, Early Greek Philosophy, 9 vols. (Loeb Classical Library), Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 2016). 
32 DK 22B53, EGPh 9 D64 (Laks & Most), 29 Marcovich, A19 Colli, 83 Kahn, 12 
Fronterotta. 
33 Hippol. IX 10.6 [= EGPh 9 D70 (Laks & Most), 47 Marcovich, A43 Colli, 92 
Kahn, 21 Fronterotta]: ἀθάνατοι θνητοί, θνητοὶ ἀθάνατοι, | ζῶντες τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον, | τὸν 
δὲ ἐκείνων βίον τεθνεῶτες (“Inmortals are mortals, mortals are inmortals; | for (the former) 
live the death of the latter, | and (would) die their life”). 
34 Th. Gomperz, Zu Heraklits Lehre und den Überresten seines Werkes, Wien, 
Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, 1886. 
35 G. S. Kirk, Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1975, p. 248. 
36 W. Burkert, Griechische Religion der archaischen und klassischen Epoche, Stuttgart, 
Kohlhammer, 1977, p. 203, state that: “Mit alle dem ist Zeus ‘Vater’, ‘Vater der Menschen 
und Götter’. ‘Vater’ sagen zu ihm auch die Götter, die nicht seine leiblichen Kinder sind, 
und alle Götter stehen vor dem Vater auf. Als ‘Vater’ rufen ihn auch die Menschen im 
Gebet, offenbar seit indogermanischer Zeit. Zeus in seiner Souveränität trifft die 
Entscheidungen, die den Lauf der Welt bestimmen. [...] Niemand kann Zeus zwingen 
oder Rechenschaft von ihm fordern, und doch sind seine Entscheidungen weder blind 
noch einseitig. Dass Zeus die Metis verschluckt hat, bedeutet die Vereinung von Macht 
und Klugheit. Vom ‘planenden Erfassen’, nóos, des Zeus ist im Epos immer wieder die 
Rede. Dieser nóos ist stets stärker als der der Menschen; es mag ‘noch’ verborgen sein, 
worauf er hinauswill, aber Zeus hat sein Ziel und wird es erreichen”. 
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Zeus can also be appreciated: ἕν, τὸ σοφὸν μοῦνον, | λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ 
ἐθέλει Ζηνὸς ὄνομα (“One [being], the only [truly] wise, | is both unwilling 
and willing to be called by the name of Zeus”).37 Thus, it can be said that 
πόλεμος, like Zeus, is established as a ‘transcendental unit’ (ἕν) that 
articulates both the life principle and the death principle,38 and, as such, 
can be given one or several different names.39 This is because the concept 
demonstrates both unity (as a transcendental principle) and multiplicity at 
once – i.e. life and death, freedom and slavery. 
This point is illustrated further in fr. 67 DK, which, firstly, affirms the 
property of being ‘one and multiple’ (via ὁ θεός) and, secondly, places 
πόλεμος as substitution instance of ὁ θεός: 
ὁ θεὸς | ἡμέρη εὐφρόνη, χειμὼν θέρος, | πόλεμος εἰρήνη, κόρος λιμός: | ἀλλοιοῦται δὲ 
ὅκωσπερ <πῦρ, | ὃ>40 ὁκόταν συμμιγῇ θυώμασιν | ὀνομάζεται καθ' ἡδονὴν ἑκάστου. 
God is | day and night, winter and summer; | war and peace, satiety and hunger; | 
and he takes various shapes (or undergoes alteration) just as fire, | which, when it is 
                                                            
37 Clem., Strom. V 115.1 [= DK22B32, EGPh 9 D45 (Laks & Most), 84 Marcovich 
A84 Colli,118 Kahn, 10 Fronterotta]. 
38 Cf. Burkert, Griechische Religion, p. 200: “Wo Geburt ist, ist auch der Tod: Dass 
diesem jungen Zeus auf Kreta auch das berüchtigte ‘Grab des Zeus’ polar zugeordnet ist, 
wo die Kureten Zeus bestatten, ist eine naheliegende Vermutung”. 
39 G. Colli, La sapienza greca, vol. III, Milano, Adelphi, 1980, p. 177, suggests that 
Heraclitus develops a transposition of the enigma presented to Homer in this fragment 
(A24 Colli = DK 22B56 = EGPh 9 D22 [Laks & Most]), which would coincide with one 
of the fundamental themes of Heraclitus: “la tendenza cioè a considerare il fondamento 
ultimo del mondo come qualcosa di celato”. From this, Colli argues that “Il nome di Zeus 
è accettabile come simbolo, come designazione umana del dio supremo, ma non è 
accettabile come designazione adeguata, proprio perché il dio supremo è qualcosa di 
nascosto, inaccesible”. Colli links this fragment to A92 and A20 Colli [= DK 22B123 and 
B54 = EGPh 9 D35, D50 (Laks & Most)]. 
40 Diels adds πῦρ from Pindar’s fr. 114b (ed. Bowra) (cf. H. Diels & W. Kranz, eds., 
Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 3 vols., Berlin, Weidmann, 1958). In Marcovich’s 
Heraclitus, p. 415-16, Diels’ amendment is taken on board, although he also adds ὃ for the 
sake of syntactic coherence (suggesting that its initial absence is a copying error) and 
because the amendment gives meaning to a comparison with ὁ θεός. This reasoning is also 
followed in F. Fronterotta, Eraclito, Milano, BUR, 2013. In Colli’s La sapienza, Diel’s 
correction is also accepted, being presented without square brackets (although Colli does 
not agree with the reasons given by Diels for the change, which are based on the 
hypothesis that the ‘doctrine of the fire’ can be said to articulate Heraclitean thought). On 
the contrary, in Ch. Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2011, and R. Cornavacca, Presocráticos: Fragmentos, 2 vols., Buenos 
Aires, Losada, 2008, Diel’s correction is rejected. In the present study, although I follow 
Marcovich’s edition, I share Colli’s belief in the need to avoid entering into debates about 
the place of ‘fire’ (πῦρ) in the thought of Heraclitus. 
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mingled with spices, | is named according to the scent of each of them (Hippol. IX 
10.8).41 
In this fragment, the ‘nominal multiplicity’ (ὀνομάζεται) upon which the 
oppositions given are based is no more than a symptom of appearances 
(καθ’ ἡδονὴν ἑκάστου); the god (ὁ θεὸς) remains a unit,42 just like that which 
is mixed (δὲ ὅκωσπερ <πῦρ>), despite any mutations that occur 
(ἀλλοιοῦται). The power of πόλεμος (i.e. “he makes some slaves, others free” 
– τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐποίησε τοὺς δὲ ἐλευθέρους) is equated with the power of 
Zeus, with the superiority of this power being established by its capacity to 
take on different forms. This idea is also reinforced in fr. 114 DK: 
ξὺν νόῳ λέγοντας | ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρὴ τῷ ξυνῷ πάντων, | ὅκωσπερ νόμῳ πόλις | καὶ πολὺ43 
ἰσχυροτέρως∙ | [5] τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι | ὑπὸ ἑνός, τοῦ θείου∙ | 
κρατεῖ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὁκόσον ἐθέλει | καὶ ἐξαρκεῖ πᾶσι | καὶ περιγίνεται. 
Those who will speak [i.e. act] with sense | must rely on what is common to all | as a 
city relies on its law, | and much more firmly: | [5] for all human laws | are nourished 
by one law, the divine law; | for it extends its power as far as it will | and is sufficient 
for all [human laws] | and still is left over (Stob., Flor. I 178).44 
In this fragment, Heraclitus not only establishes ‘the divine’ (τοῦ θείου) as a 
unit upon which all things (ὑπὸ ἑνός) rely (like πόλεμος and Zeus in fr. 53 
and fr. 32 respectively); he also equates the divine with the relationship 
                                                            
41 DK 22B67, EGPh 9 D48 (Laks & Most), 77 Marcovich, A91 Colli, 133 Kahn, 28 
Fronterotta. 
42 In Colli, La Sapienza, p. 156, this is interpreted in a similar way to the ‘unity of 
opposites’ invoked by Apollo and Dionysus (Apollo: day = summer, satiety, peace; 
Dionysus: night = winter, hunger, war). He indicates, however, that ὁ θεός does not 
suggest that πόλεμος is a ‘unifying principle’; on the contrary, it operates as a ‘scattering 
principle’ because “rivela, scopre, dimostra, ἔδειξε, la natura e il foggiare delle individualità 
essenziali che lo precedono, τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς... τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους”. Heraclitus thus requires 
λόγος as a ‘unifying principle’ because, for Colli, it is a pure form that operates on the level 
of representation, eliminating the noumenal dispersion of individualities and enabling the 
harmonious union of opposites, and thus facilitating the articulation of the phenomenon 
in its radical multiplicity (συνάψιες ὅλα καὶ οὐχ ὅλα – A27 Colli = DK 22B10 = EGPh 9 
D47 [Laks & Most], cf. Colli, La sapienza, p. 184-185). Nevertheless, this interpretation, 
in spite of its theoretical richness, presents a hermeneutic problem: it presupposes the 
plane of representation to be the intellectual framework in which Heraclitean concepts 
operate. This presumption is problematic insofar as such theoretical developments acquire 
meaning only from the Schwellenzeit produced in modernity. Here, intellectual operations 
linked to the development of concepts such as ‘consciousness’, ‘will’, ‘interiority’ and 
‘abstraction’ are also required. 
43 πόλις in the codices, corrected by Schleirmacher. 
44 DK 22B114, EGPh 9 D105 (Most & Laks), 23 Marcovich, A11 Colli, 30 Kahn, 6 
Fronterotta. 
Archaic Thought and Sophistry in Herodotus’ Histories 3.38.1 
 89 
between νόμος and πόλις. Provencal,45 following Humphreys,46 considers 
this passage to be an expression of the Heraclitean conception of the 
‘divine νόμος’, adding that this description has a greater degree of similarity 
to Herodotus’ notion of νόμος than that which can be seen in the ‘cultural 
relativism’ of the sophists. Both the Ionian philosopher and the historian 
of Halicarnassus state that every human norm (located in the plane of 
multiplicity: πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι) is governed by divine norms 
(located on the plane of the unit: ὑπὸ ἑνός), thus rendering νόμοι subject to 
a universal principle.47  
In contrast, Berruecos Frank48 appeals to the equivalence between τῷ 
ξυνῷ πάντων in Heraclitus and the use of κοινός (meaning ‘the State’ or ‘the 
government’ in Herodotus – 1.67.5, 5.85.1, 9.117, 5.109.3, 6.14.3, etc.) to 
suggest that ξὺν νόῳ λέγοντας (fr. 114 DK) represents ‘the ideal rulers’. This 
idea can be supported by an analysis of 7.8.δ.2, in which Xerxes contrasts 
ἰδιοβουλέειν (linked with the sovereign) with τίθημι τὸ πρῆγμα ἐς μέσον. 
Berruecos Frank thus argues that, in fr. 109 DK (κρύπτειν ἀμαθίην κρέσσον 
ἢ ἐς τὸ μέσον φέρειν),49 ἐς μέσον refers to power, government and the 
command of public affairs. He contends that fr. 109 DK should be read in 
consonance with fr. 114 DK as such an approach enables to one consider 
πόλεμος as the νόμος of πόλις. Thus, the use of the verb ἰσχυρίζεσθαι in fr. 
                                                            
45 Cf. V. L. Provencal, Sophist King. Persian as Others in Herodotus, London, 
Bloomsbury, 2015, p. 51-52. 
46 Humphreys, “Law”. 
47 In Á. Cappelletti, La filosofía de Heráclito de Éfeso, Caracas, Monte Ávila, 1969, p. 
101-104, it is asserted that this principle places the law above the ruler in Heraclitean 
thought. This reading coincides with the interpretation of the passage in Pindar fr. 169 
Snell [= Bowra 152] proposed by Guthrie in The Sophist, p. 131-134, for whom both gods 
and men are subject to the power of νόμος – a position also taken in Kirk’s Heraclitus, p. 
248, for whom in Heraclitus’ fr. DK 22B67 [= EGPh 9 D48 (Laks & Most)] πόλεμος 
would refer to a ‘universal war’. The problem with Cappelletti’s proposal lies in the 
anachronistic interpretation of νόμος as ‘law (writing)’ – cf. T. Vitek, “Heraclitus, DK 22 
B 44 (frg. 103, Marcovich)”, Emérita, 130 (2), 2012, p. 295-320 (especially p. 302-308). 
48 B. Berruecos Frank, “ΠΟΛΥΠΕΙΡΟΣ ΣΟΦΙΑ. Heródoto en la historia de la 
filosofía griega”, Ph.D. Thesis, supervised by Jaume Pòrtulas, Barcelona, Universidad 
Autónoma de Barcelona, 2013, p. 396-402. 
49 Stob. III 1.175 [= DK 22B109, 110 Marcovich, 68 Colli, 107 Kahn, 53 
Fronterotta]. Berruecos Frank, ΠΟΛΥΠΕΙΡΟΣ, p. 398, follow here the reading of A. 
García Calvo, Razón común, Madrid, Lucina, 2006, p. 93, who accepts the reading of 
Florilegio, against Marcovich, Heraclitus, who considers the reading derived from (a1) Plut. 
an virtus doceri possit 439D, (a2) De audiendo 43D, (a3) qu. conviv. III 1: ἀμαθίην κρύπτειν 
ἄμεινον. In this reading Marcovich is followed by Kahn, The Art, and Fronterotta, Eraclito. 
Although Colli, La sapienza, follows the Florilegio – like Berruecos Frank and García 
Calvo – he excludes ἢ ἐς τὸ μέσον φέρειν. 
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114 DK is equated with νόμος ἰσχυρός in Hdt. 7.102.1, in which ‘the force’ 
is situated as a representation of the superlative degree of judicial logic and, 
hence, a secularisation of the ‘divine law’. This reading of the rupture 
between the conception of νόμος in Heraclitus and Herodotus, upon which 
Berruecos Frank argues the rejection of a lectio facilior in fr. 109 DK is 
based, presents at least two problems: (a) it presupposes a defence of 
democracy on the part of Herodotus, which is somewhat difficult to affirm 
definitively50 and (b) it neglects one of the aspects pointed out by 
Provencal51 – i.e. that democratic discourse is placed in the words of the 
Persians or the ‘barbarians’ in Herodotus’ narrative, which renders the 
defence of democracy difficult. Nonetheless, although this ‘rupturist 
reading’ of Herodotus’ stance regarding archaic thought is hard to sustain, 
a wholesale rejection of the use of methodological ruptures in other archaic 
narrative practices is not implied here. 
Before considering Herodotus’ role in the defence of the rupture 
produced by ‘sophistical cultural relativism’, therefore, we can assert that 
the notion of νόμος elaborated by Herodotus presents a reaffirmation of the 
archaic notion of the term. This contention is based on an understanding 
of ‘divine normativity’ as a transcendental norm that establishes the order 
of the πόλις, in which divine punishment is the consequence of its non-
fulfilment. 
3. Concluding remarks 
An examination of the concepts that constitute the sophistical νόμος-φύσις 
opposition in Herodotus’ discourse highlights the ways in which the 
                                                            
50 In Herodotus the equivalence of the terms δημοκρατίη (6.131.1), δημοκρατέεσθαι 
(6.43.3), ἰσοκρατίη (5.92α.1, cf. 4.26.2) and ἐλευθερίη (3.142.2), is carried out in 
opposition to τύραννος. Cf. D. Asheri, A. Lloyd & A. Corcella, A Commentary on 
Herodotus Books I-IV, edited by O. Murray & A. Moreno, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2007, p. 474-475; J. Gallego, La democracia en tiempos de tragedia, Buenos Aires, 
Miño y Dávila, 2003, p. 279-280; D. Plácido Suárez, “De Heródoto a Tucídides”, Gerión, 
4, 1986, p. 17-46, espec. p. 20-24; P. Georges, Barbarian Asia and the Greek Experience, 
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, p. 37-46; A. W. Saxonhouse, Athenian 
Democracy. Modern Mythmaker and Ancient Theorist, Notre Dame, University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1996, p. 31-57; Id., “The Tyranny of Reason in the World of the Polis”, 
APSR, 82 (4), 1988, p. 1261-1275, especially p. 1263. 
51 Provencal, Sophist King, p. 179-180. Cf. F. Hartog, Le miroir d’Hérodote. Essai sur 
la représentation de l’autre, 1980, trans. J. Lloyd, The Mirror of Herodotus. The 
representation of the Other in the Writing of History, Berkeley, University of California 
Press, 1988, p. 237-248. 
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context of the symbolic struggle for power is inscribed upon the text itself. 
Furthermore, as hypothesised, the conceptual framework in which these 
concepts are articulated shifts the meanings attributed by sophistry, 
revealing the problematic nature of the referent. 
Although the Herodotean conception of νόμος infers the intellectual 
debates demarcated by sophistry, this cannot be considered a mere 
reproduction of the debate; rather, the text reveals a particular historical 
position. This finding demonstrates the problematic nature of the 
definition of these concepts in the context of the development of Athenian 
democracy. Disputes over the tension between nature and convention do 
not respond to the idle needs of a group of foreign intellectuals in search of 
eccentricity; rather, they turn out to be an index of the problematic 
situation established by life in the polis. Herodotus and the sophists can be 
considered to have operated as intellectuals who sought to intervene in 
political decisions through theoretical dispute, albeit from the plane of ‘the 
political’ (that is, outside the institutional mechanisms established by the 
polis). Thus, the discourses that circulate in the textual plane assume 
performative roles, being devices of ideological production. Here, the 
context is inscribed upon the text, thus blurring the distinction between 
opposing positions because existing closed systems are not reproduced; 
instead, fields are opened up that facilitate disputes about hegemony.52  
 
                                                            
52 Here, I refer to the Gramscian concept of ‘hegemony’, according to which the 
direction of a class is defined not only by a society’s political leadership, but also by its 
intellectual, cultural and moral leadership. This implies that a series of practices and 
symbolic representations functions in the exercise of power (A. Gramsci, Quaderni del 
carcere, 4 vols., Torino, Einaudi, 1977, vol. II, p. 703-704, and vol. III, p. 1518-1520). 
Although this concept was designed to explain the hierarchy of domination in modern 
capitalist societies (and may prove, therefore, to be irrelevant when applied wholesale to 
pre-capitalist societies), such a formulation could be useful in relation to other societies, if 
limits are established regarding the relevant conditions of conceptual production (i.e. 
absenting modern philosophies of consciousness) and the appropriate conditions for 
conceptual application (i.e. modifying the focus on capitalist societies). Although the 
space is lacking here to develop such points further, an interesting discussion on such 
possibilities can be found in Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, p. 134-45; Laclau, Los 
fundamentos, p. 99-125; E. Balibar, “Laclau, hegemonía, Europa”, in Debates y combates, 
Edición homenaje a Ernesto Laclau, 2015, vol. II, p. 49-62; J. Butler, “Competing 
Universalities”, in J. Butler, E. Laclau & S. Žižek, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: 
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